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Abstract 
A study was designed to permit quantitative 
I 
I 
. I comparisons. 
! 
between majority influence (conformity) and minority ~nfluence 
' (innovation),.to assess group cohesiveness and behavioral 
' . ' . 
s.tyle as media tors of each form of influence, and to :test 
j 
I . 
the hypothesis that whereas majorities produce more manifest 
I 
influence than minorities, minorities produce.more lajtent 
' ' influence than majorities. The study employed a 2 x 2 x 2 
I 
design, varying source status (majority or minority), group 
cohesiveness (high or iow) and behavioral style (high or low 
consistency), and assessed influence· on both the manifest 
and latent level. Results confirmed.the greater infllehce 
of majorities on a manifest level :but .not of minoritiles on 
a latent level. . I· 
I . 
I. 
I 
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.I 
Social influence research has traditionally been cbncerned ., 
with the process of conformity or majority influence (Allen, 
. . . 
1965; Kiesler & Kiesler, 1969) and only recently, with ihe 
process of innovation (Levine, , 1980; Mos.covic'i, 1976) , This 
latter research has turned the conformity question around and 
asked how and to what extent individuals and active ~inbrities 
can influence the majority. These two forms of influence, 
conformity and innovation, have typically been stu'd'ied by 
. different investigators, in different experimental ·situltio~s. 
. ' 
I 
Thus, it has been difficult to compare the processes un.derlying 
majority and minority influence and to determine the re·lati ve 
' 
magni tu.de of their effec·ts, 
As Doms 
.. . . . I 
and Van Avermaet (1980) have pointed out, rhe 
difference between the conformity and innoration most notable 
paradigms concerns the composition· or the experimental group. 
. ' 
y, hereas research on conformity investigates the effects! of a 
I 
r.1ajority on a single individual,. innovation research lo
1
oks at 
I 
the effects of a mimrity on a group.· Thus, in the innovation 
I . 
situation, subjects are exposed not onl~ to the influence of 
the source but also 'to the reactions of the other targelts. · Qne 
· · 1 th · t I. b .t · solution to this problem would be to simu ate e dis ,i u ion 
of majority and minority· opinions in the experimental group 
a nd to assess the. effects of that di~tribution on a sirkle . . . I 
individual (Wolf & Latam[, 1981). A primary .purpose o:f the 
. •' 
2 
present rese!"-rch, then, was to study ma.jority and minority 
influence in the context of a single experiment, with a 
simulated distribution of opinions in the experimental\group. 
I Because researchers have addressed themselves to : 
influence by only one or the other of the factions, they 
have arrived at highly divergent explanations of the influence 
process (Latane & Wolf, 1981). Explanations of majority 
i:nfluence focus on the dependence of individuals up.on the 
group either for information or for the material and 
psychological benefits .the group can ·provide (Jones & Gerard, 
1967). Among the variables thought to increase the dependence 
of individuals upon the group, cohesiveness. has re~eived the 
most experimental attention (Berkowitz, 1954; Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955; Festi.nger, 1950; Thibaut & Strickland, 1956). There is 
recent evidence, however, that cohesiveness also mediates 
minority influence (Wolf, 1979). The question that remains 
is whether cohesi vene·ss is quantitatively a more ·important 
determinant of majority influence than of minority infILuence 
(Latane & Wolf, 1981). 
Since majorities are seldom in a position of dependence 
upon the minority, Moscovici and his colleagues have afgued 
that dependence cannot be the .mechanism by which minority 
influence operates (Moscovici & Faucheux, 197~; Moscovici & 
Nemeth, 1974), Rather they pro·pose that behavioral st~le, 
the consistency and confidence with which the influenc;e source 
presents his opinions, is the decisive factor in min~~ity 
influence. Again it is possible that behavioral stylJ also 
. ' 
' 
J 
mediates the effects of majority influence but its rela~tive 
I 
i_mportance for the two influence sources ·remains to be j 
determined. A second purpose of the present research, !then, 
was to compare the effects of group cohesiveness .a·nd be'havioral 
I 
style- on conformity and innovation. · I 
' Moscovici ( 1980) has recently proposed that majori!ty and 
minority influence differ. not quantitatively but qualitatively. 
' 
I 
·lie suggests that whereas majorities have their greates~ impact 
. . . I . 
on manifest or behavioral response~, minorities produce.their 
strongest influence on.the latent or cognitive-perceptual level 
underlying the manifest response. While Moscovici has;presented 
I 
' ' 
some evidence in favor of this proposition (Moscovici &·Lage, · 
1976; Mos~ovici & Personnaz, 1980), other studies havelchallenged 
. , I 
'its validity (Dams & Van Avermaet, 1980; 'sorrentino; K~ng & Leo, 
. . . . I 
1980·) . A final purpose of the present research.' then, i was to 
provide a further test of Moscovici's interesting hyporhesis, 
using a new and more realistic measure of latent influ~nce 
(Wolf, 1979). 
In summary, the present.study was designed to permit . ' 
quantitative comparisons between majority and minoritylinfluence, 
I 
to assess the relative eff~cts of group cohesiveness ahd 
. I 
behavioral style as mediators of each form of influence, and to 
test the.hypothesis that whereas majorities produce mo~e manifest 
influen.ce than minorities, minoritie~ produce more lat:ent in~luence 
than majorities. The atudy employed a 2 x 2 x 2 betwelen-subJects 
design, varying source status (majority or minority), group 
cohesiveness (high or low) and behavioral style (high or low 
consistency), and assessed influence on both the manifest and 
latent level. 
4 
-Method 
i 
Subjects J 
The subjects were 128 female undergraduates -who we(e 
paid $J.OO- for their participation in the 90-minute st~dy 
\ 
of "mock juries". The responses of 32 subjects were. not 
1 ~ 
included in the analyses of the data due to an g priori[ 
. ' 
' ' 
dec.ision to exclude subjects whose ini tia.l judgments ori the 
. . I 
' 
experimental issue .fell outside of· a pres.cribed range, iThus, 
there were 12 subjects in each of the experimental 
Procedure 
i 
conditions. 
I 
The subjects were run in gro~ps of four and asked·to 
' 
play the role of jurors deliberating on a .civil case. funder 
the pretext that the study involved verbal and nonverb~l 
. I 
communication, they discussed the case by exchanging nbtes 
I 
' and were separated from one another by barriers. i 
Cohesiveness manipulation, Prior to .de.li bera tionl. subjects 
introduced themselves and talked· about their.interests[ activities 
in scho"ol and so forth.. They then indicated their impbession 
I 
' ' 
of each other "juror" on a scale ranging from -5 (Disl~ke) to 
+<;(Like).· Two levels of cohesiveness we~e created by/later 
. . I . . 
providing subjects with· bogus information ab.out these ~atings. 
. I . 
Whereas high cohesive subjects learned that group membrrs had 
. . I . 
rated one another very posi ti.vely,. low cohesiv'e subjecls learned 
that t_he ratings were quite negative. I. 
Following the introductions, barriers were erectJd and 
subjects we~e given a trial transcript and an identification 
letter from A to D, · In fact, all subjects were B and IJur~rs A, 
c· and D were represented by means of prewri tten commui:;iica'tions. 
I 
5 
' At .this point, subjects rendered an initial judgment o~ the 
I 
case, which involved· a repairman who had been injured in the 
defendant's home. T_he facts .of the case were weighted to 
encourage an initial judgment between 15 and 45 thousand 
I . 
I dollars and subjects whose ·judgments were not in that range 
I 
'•1ere excluded from the analyses. 
,. 
Source status manipulation. Subjects ~egan their: 
I 
deliberation by writing a firs·t note about the case on! a set 
i 
' of carbon pape_rs (permitting 3 copies of each note to be 
produced simultaneously; one for each of. the other jur'.ors) . 
So that the jurors "would know 
case", a bogus distribution of 
' where everyone stood on the 
I 
initial judgments was ~rovided 
I 
for each subject, according to the following sched·ule ,: 
. . i 
Minority Influence Conditions Majority Influence Coriditions 
Juror A: S's judgment + $3,000 Juror.A_: "'$-'-7_,_,....:·0....:0....:0c.__ _ --'----
1 
J 1:1ror B: S 's ,judgment. 
Juror C: "'$_,5_,_,....:o;_;o'-'o'---------
cTt,i.ror D: S's judgment - $2, 000 
Juror B: S's judgment I 
I 
Juror C: $"..._5_,_,-"0-=0-=0-~-,..--1---
1 
Juror D: =$....:2~·~0~0~0~-~-___,I,.--__ _ 
I 
In effect, this study was concerned w·i th the influence of 
I 
bogus Juror C on the naive subject B. In half the ~-oAdi tions, 
I 
Juror C maintained the majority viewpoint, shared by <jurors A 
. I 
and D, of a minimal compensation for the plaintiff.· In the 
I 
other conditions, Juror C advocated the minority viewpoint, 
not shared by any of the other group members, of :a mihimal 
· · h · t· I . th compensation. It may be_ noted that in bot condi ions, e . . . 1 
range_ of majority opinions was $5,.000 and the range oif group 
opinions varied from $1J, 000 to $43, 000, depending u.pllon the 
subject's initial judgment. · 
.. • 
. 6 
Consist-ency manipulation. Afterthe subjects finished 
wri t:j.ng their first notes, they were 6.ollected by the Jxperimente;, 
who replaced them with prewri tten notes signed by JuroJs A •. c I 
' and D and redistributed them. After reading t~e notes ostensibiy 
written by the other jurors, subjects wrote· a second note about 
- • I .. I 
i ' 
the case. In all, the deliberation consisted off.our such 
exchanges. The' notes from Jurors A and n·raised very ! general 
' . ' 
issues about the case, without referring to a specific iamount 
' J. 
of compensation. The notes from Juror C, on the 0th.er !hand, all 
I 
supported her contention that $5,000 was the appropria~e amount. 
The consistency manipulation was 
final note from Juror C. In the 
contained in the fourth anci · 
High Consistent condiJions, 
. . I 
these notes ended, "I still think $5, 000 is the faires~ judgment'', 
' 
whereas in the Low Consistent ·conditions they ended, "] though~ 
I 
$5,000 was the fairest judgment but now I'm not so sure". . .. . .. I 
Following the fourth exchange of notes, subjects rendered 
I . 
a final, ano_nymous judgment about the case and completed a post-
1 
experimental questionnaire containing checks on the efflectiveness 
I 
of the manipulations and measures assessing the subjec-tis' 
perceptions of the other group members. l 
Before the_ subjects were debrief_ed, they were ask~d to 
. I . 
c:om])lete a short, ostensibly unrelated task. They were told that . - I 
a lawyer who had been. helping us with the study had asked· us .to 
collect some information for him about how people view the 
severity of different types and degrees of punishment. ·The 
;;ubjects filled out a three-page questionnaire 
series of 21-point scales. On the first page, 
containing a 
I . . 
include~ to divert 
·- :• 
7 
suspicion,_subjects ratecl the severity of different p~ison 
terms. On the second and third pages, they rated the severity. 
of different .fines and the usefulness to a defendant of 
These latter questionjs. different compensation awards. 
I assessed subjects' .·perceptions of the value of money and . I. 
·subje'cts 
I 
were included as measures of latent influence. who 
' had been influ.enced by Juror C on a latent level shou'ld have 
I 
viewed the fines as more severe and the·compensation awards 
as more useful than subjects· who had not been so 
. Results 
influenced. ' 
I 
I· 
I 
I 
I 
I• 
. . I . 
Although the subjects interacted with one another, they 
' . 
' 
were separated by barriers prior to the introduction ;of the 
. i 
experimental manipulations and were presumed to be irtdependent· 
I . :for ·the purpose of statistical .arial;rsis. \ 
Effectiveness of the Manipulations 
Cohesiveness. On 21-point scales, subjects indicated 
how much they liked the other members of the jury as la group 
and how much they thought the other group members liked them. . I 
. I . 
Unfortunately, analyses revealed no effects of the cohesiveness . . . . I 
manipulation on these m.easures. Al though the presen11 
I 
manipulation has been used successfully iri previous riesearch 
i 
(Wolf, 1979), its failure in this .study prevents us .,rom 
drawing conclusions about the effects of cohesiveness. 
Consistenc,y. The manipulation of consistency wds highly 
.effective in creating diffe.rential perceptions of co I idence, 
I 
8 
. F (1,88) =. 30,57, Q 4.0001, and willingness to compr~mise 
I 
with the group, E (1,88) = 21.82, :Q..( .0001. When sh~ was 
I 
consistent, Juror C was seen as more confident of her 
I 
opinions (X = 14.4) and less willing to compromise w~th 
the group (x = 6.1) than when she was inconsistent (X = 
8.5.and X = 11.0, respectively). Thus, the consistency 
manipulation.resulted in the attributional consequences 
necessary to test hypotheses about be·havioral style. 
Source status. On 21-point sca.les, subjects ·indicated 
the similarity of each other juror's ini tia·l judgment· to her 
own. Results on these measures indicate that subjects 
attended to the information they were given about the 
distribution of opinions in the group. 'Since she advocated 
. the same· $.5, 000 figure in all conditions, we ex·pected no 
effects on .the. measure concerning the similarity of Juror C 
and indeed we found none. The reported judgments of:Jurors 
' A and D, on the other hand, were similar to those of,the 
subjects in the Minority Source conditions and different 
in the Majori~y Source conditions. Analyses of vari~nce 
rielded main effects for source status on the mea.sur'T concerning 
Juror A,£ (1,87) = 33.02, 12£ .0001, and on the measure 
concerning Juror D, E (1,87) = 39.38, p ~.0001. i J ur9r A 
was seen as more similar in the Minority Source conditions 
(X = 15.2) than in the Majority Source conditions (X:= 9.1). 
! 
Likewise, Juror D was seen as more similar in the Minority 
I 
Source conditions (15.4) than in the Majority Sourcelconditions 
I (X = 8.4), The manipulation; therefore, was successful. 
' I 
• e 
9 
Majority and Minority Influence 
t. 
Manifes·t influence. Subjects. rend~red compensat'ion 
judgments_ both before· and following th.e group. interac:tion. 
Since the·final measure was anonymous, a change in judgment 
I 
in. the. direction of a decreased compensation award re1flects 
i 
·an internalized acceptance of the position espciused b'y 
Juror C. I 
I 
I 
Analysis of the judgment change data revealed a :main 
effect for source status, E ( 1, 88) = 16. 34, :Q <. 0001 .1 When 
I 
the minimal compensation award advocated by Juror C r 1epresented 
i 
a majority position in the group, subjects reduced tlteir 
judgments by an average of $10,760. When the mini~a~, award 
i 
advocated by Juror C represented a mino.ri ty opinion i!n the 
t 
group, on the other hand, the average reduction in jJdgments 
. . I .· 
was only $3, 260. There were· no effects for group co~esi veness. 
or for behavioral style, nor were there any interact~ons 
I 
involving.those variables, Whi),e the absence of an effect 
for cohesiveness may be due to the failure of the e~Jerimental 
manipulation, the abse_nce of an effect for behaviora~ style 
.poses problems for Moscovici' s theory. 
' 
Perceived influence. In order to determine whether 
I 
subjects thought that other gro_up members had changed! their 
judgments over the. course of the deliberation, they were asked 
. I 
. I 
estimate the final judgment of each of the other jurors. From 
_these perceived final judgments the initial judgments, as 
reported to subjects on 
sheet, wer·e subtracted, 
the initial
1
judgment dist~ibufion 
resulting in perceived judgment change 
scores. for bogus jurors A, C and D. 
10 
Analyses of variance yielded main effects for 
status on the measures concerning Juror A, F( ~, 86) 
:Q.(.0001, and Juror D, E (1, 86) = 17,9·2, 12.<:'...0001. 
sou;rce 
I F 48.26, 
J In the 
' Majority Source conditions, where these bogus jurorsi initially 
. I 
favored a minimal compensation award, they were both: seen as 
moving toward a higher judgment. Juror A was perceiyed to 
increase her judgment by $2550, and Juror D, by $566b. In 
. ' 
the Minority Source conditions, where these jur~rs initially 
favored a generous compensation award, Juror A was p:er.ceived 
to decrease her judgment by $4150., while virtually no change 
was seen on the part of Juror D. 
Analysis of the measure concerning bogus Juror b revealed· 
both a mai.n effect for source status, E (1,86) = 7,19, J:>~.009, 
and a main effect for consistency, F (1,86) = 32.20, ]2.(.0001. 
The interaction of these variables was also significant, 
' 
F (1,86) = 8.29, J:>~.005. The pattern of means demonstrates 
that when she was highly consistent, Juror C was not' seen as 
' changing her judgment in either the Majority Source :or the 
Minority Source conditions, again attesting to the e'ffecti veness 
' ' of the consistency manipulation. When she was incotjsistent, on 
• 
the other hand, Juror C was perceived to increase her judgment 
by $2580. in the Majority Source condition and by $i190; .in the 
Minority Source condition. 
The overall pattern of results on these measures indicates 
. I 
that in all conditions, the group was perceived as moving toward 
a consensus, However'· the group was seen as coming closer to 
·achieving that consensus in the Majority Source 
in the Minority Source conditions. 
conch tions than 
I 
I 
.. 
. I 
Latent influence. Embedded.in the "q_uestionnaiJe 
th 1 " . . •th 1 . 11 e awyer were measures concerning e pena ty va ue 
a $5,'000. ahd a $25,000 fine and 'the utility value of a 
$5,000 and a $25,000 compensation award .. These items 
. I 
11 
for 
Of 
con_cerned the perception of t.he value of money and were 
I , 
included as measures of latent influence. The $5 ,.000 ·figure! 
representeq the critical stimulus employed in the orJginal 1 
influence situ~tion and $25,000 reflected a normativJ .i..nitiat 
judgment in the original influence situation. SubjeJts who , 
I 
had been influenced on a cognitive-perceptual level should 
I 
I have viewed the fines a_s more severe and the awards as more 
useful than subjects who had not been so influenced. 
Unfortunately·, no significant effects· emerged on any of 
these measures, casting doubt upon Moscovici's hypothesis. 
I 
There are two possible explanations for the lack of results: 
. . . I . 
either no influence was pfoduced on the laterit level or · 
. . I 
majorities .and minorities produce comparable levels of such 
influence·(cf, Dams & Van Avermaet, 1980). Since we I did not 
.. I 
obtain premeasures on these items, nor did we include an 
appropriate control condition, we .cannot determine w~ich. of 
1 t . . t I . . M . I. ' these a terna· l. ves is correc· . .n any case, oscovici s 
notion that minorities produce~ latent influence than 
majorities receives no support· from the present findings; 
Discussion · 
The primary purpose of the. pres~nt. i~vestigat~o1 ~va~ to . 
c6mpare the infiuence produced oy maJorities and minorities in 
12 
a single· e:i_cperiment. Not unexpectedly, majorities we're found 
to be more influential than minorities, at least on Jeasures 
of manifest influence. In fact, a majority of three broduced 
about /three time.s as much influence as. a minority o.f rne. 
Latane and Wolf (1981) have recently·argued that inflrence 
by either a majority or a minority should be a func.tibn of 
its size. The present data co~firm their specu~ationl. 
I 
There is little evidence that the ·influence prodrced 
by e.ither the majority or the minority was mediated by the 
I 
behavioral style of the influence source. Although the 
consistency manipulation resulted in the appropriate 
the present data challenge Moscovici's position that 
is a source of influence pressure,' . 
Finally, Moscovici's hypothesis that minorities 
' attributions, 
bonsistency 
I ·. 
I 
produce 
more latent influence than majorities was not supportkd by the 
I 
present findings. The question tha.t remains is whethkr · 
I 
majorities prodtJce comparable levels of change on thel latent. 
level or whether perceptual change is an unlikely reshlt of 
influence processes,. j 
Further research is necessary to c~arify the re~hlts on 
the latent influence items and to test the effects of group 
cohesiveness as a mediator of majority·and minority infiuence. 
I 
the viability of The present results do, however, ·attest to 
the present paradigm for ·investigating these issues. 
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